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The picture emerging from these explorations of Bishop's work is one of a poet more concerned with the way subjectivity shapes our apprehension of the world than with what is out there to be apprehended and known. In placing Bishop in the pragmatist tradition in American letters, Harrison associates her specifically with the neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty that denies the possibility of discoverable truths about the world. There are at least two distinct versions of pragmatism, however: Rorty's antirealist pragmatism and a realist pragmatist philosophy committed to a model of knowledge based on scientific inquiry.3 Bishop's poetry, I propose, 1. McCabe: "We can never know-we can only compare and imagine" (xv). Harrison: "A pragmatic world, in which the relations between things are necessarily as real as the things themselves, is left with interacting subjects discovering the use or pleasure of any reality, without a higher authority-poet, God, language, science, encompassing and controlling the process" (3).
2. For Biasing, Bishop examines "positions and constructions rather than nature and reified truths" (78). For Dickie, "Bishop's interest in geography has always been an interest in representation. She is more often engaged in commenting on how a landscape is conceived than in looking at it directly herself" (143).
3. Nicholas Rescher distinguishes these two kinds as "subjective" and "objective" The picture emerging from these explorations of Bishop's work is one of a poet more concerned with the way subjectivity shapes our apprehension of the world than with what is out there to be apprehended and known. In placing Bishop in the pragmatist tradition in American letters, Harrison associates her specifically with the neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty that denies the possibility of discoverable truths about the world. There are at least two distinct versions of pragmatism, however: Rorty's antirealist pragmatism and a realist pragmatist philosophy committed to a model of knowledge based on scientific inquiry.3 Bishop's poetry, I propose, 1. McCabe: "We can never know-we can only compare and imagine" (xv). Harrison: "A pragmatic world, in which the relations between things are necessarily as real as the things themselves, is left with interacting subjects discovering the use or pleasure of any reality, without a higher authority-poet, God, language, science, encompassing and controlling the process" (3).
3. Nicholas Rescher distinguishes these two kinds as "subjective" and "objective" The picture emerging from these explorations of Bishop's work is one of a poet more concerned with the way subjectivity shapes our apprehension of the world than with what is out there to be apprehended and known. In placing Bishop in the pragmatist tradition in American letters, Harrison associates her specifically with the neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty that denies the possibility of discoverable truths about the world. There are at least two distinct versions of pragmatism, however: Rorty's antirealist pragmatism and a realist pragmatist philosophy committed to a model of knowledge based on scientific inquiry.3 Bishop's poetry, I propose, is more in keeping with this second-but historically first-kind of philosophy.4
The American pragmatists Charles Sanders Peirce, John Dewey, William James, and the more recent Richard Rorty all are concerned with the provisionality of knowledge, but not all deny the possibility of mind-independent truths. Peirce and Dewey, particularly, identify the scientific method as the paradigm of knowledge. Under the scientific method, observations of and hypotheses about the world can be correct or incorrect, more or less accurate. For this branch of pragmatists, regarding our conclusions as provisional (more like hypotheses than like certain knowledge) acknowledges the difficulty of making contact with the world but also expresses the desire to discover what is really the case about that world. The scientific model of knowledge assumes that the result of or answer to an investigation is somehow out there, not simply an effect of our thinking. It is this version of pragmatism, and not the Rortian neo-pragmatism indistinguishable from relativism, that I see Bishop using.
I am particularly concerned with the role of the community in the Peirce-Dewey model of knowledge, and its relevance to Bishop's work. For Peirce, the mutual checking and confirmation carried out by members of the scientific community ensure the correctness of their investigative results. Following Peirce, Dewey generalizes this "community of inquiry" to include the larger social collectivity (in ways that I elaborate and document in section 2). For Bishop also, I argue, other people crucially intervene in one's attempt to know the world. In many of her poems, as in "Cape Breton," being alone coincides with not knowing enough, and inference from evidence seems to bring the speaker into closer contact with a social world (for example, the unseen motorboat). Bishop hangs fire about the causal connections between isolation and ignorance: am I isolated from others by the private and limited nature of experience, or not able to know enough about the world because of the absence of other people who might be able to tell me more about it? It is clear, however, that inference is the first step toward contact with the world, including other people, and that other people's testimony provides evidence to confirm or correct the truth of one's inferences. Furthermore-a point not explored by the pragmatists-the promise of others' companionship motivates and gives meaning to the search for accurate accounts of the world. For Bishop, knowledge is social, but not in the constructivist sense that we collectively agree on what will count as true; rather, others help me to find out more about the mind-independent world.5 She is a realist, with a tentative or provisional attitude toward knowledge: my reliance on others' testimony to help me better know the world means that I must be willing to change my account of it as they present new evidence.
Bishop's famous "Darwin letter" and her late dramatic monologue "Crusoe in England" (discussed in sections 3 and 4 below) beautifully explore this complex of ideas about knowledge and other people. In the letter, Bishop compares Charles Darwin's hypothesis-formation to empathic contact with other people. In the poem, many of whose details correspond to Darwin's diary entries about his trip to the Galapagos, she meditates on the difficulty of knowing anything in the absence of other people. On a formal level, Bishop engages with the social dimension of knowledge through the use of a dramatic speaker: Crusoe frames his attempts to know the world as speech to an audience, whose attention and ratification he seeks. In "Crusoe" and other poems (including "Rainy Season; Sub-Tropics" and "Poem," discussed in section 5), the colloquy invoked by the dramatic speaker is an image of the community of inquiry. Getting a response from other people, these poems suggest, is fundamental to finding out what is true.
The following discussion brings together Bishop's pragmatist orientation and her fascination with Darwin to propose a new un-5. Zhou Xiaojing's recent work on Bishop identifies her poetry as "dialogic," though not in the sense I intend here; for him, the dialogic element resides in her use of other poets and thinkers as sources as well as opponents in the development of her own ideas. This dialogism is an instance of the kind that takes place in her poems, according to my argument, whereby knowledge arises as a consequence of the interaction between minds. from others by the private and limited nature of experience, or not able to know enough about the world because of the absence of other people who might be able to tell me more about it? It is clear, however, that inference is the first step toward contact with the world, including other people, and that other people's testimony provides evidence to confirm or correct the truth of one's inferences. Furthermore-a point not explored by the pragmatists-the promise of others' companionship motivates and gives meaning to the search for accurate accounts of the world. For Bishop, knowledge is social, but not in the constructivist sense that we collectively agree on what will count as true; rather, others help me to find out more about the mind-independent world.5 She is a realist, with a tentative or provisional attitude toward knowledge: my reliance on others' testimony to help me better know the world means that I must be willing to change my account of it as they present new evidence.
The following discussion brings together Bishop's pragmatist orientation and her fascination with Darwin to propose a new un-The speaker still knows very little: the road's emptiness makes it "appear" abandoned (but is it really?); we "cannot see" into the interior. The driverless bulldozers, however, while reminding us of the absence of other people, also testify to the possibility of social activity, and as such they seem to produce the surprising introduction of the pronoun "we." The "we" cannot see into the interior but possesses some kind of knowledge about it anyway: there "deep lakes are reputed to be." Moving into the social world (the world of work, albeit temporarily suspended) permits a new kind of evidence, the testimony of others.
This possibility of better knowledge raised by the suggestion of contact with other people finds its most optimistic expression near the end of the poem, when a bus drives by, passing "the closed roadside stand, the closed schoolhouse."
It stops, and a man carrying a baby gets off, climbs over a stile, and goes down through a small steep meadow, which establishes its poverty in a snowfall of daisies, to his invisible house beside the water.
What is the status of the man's "invisible house"? Has the speaker become so excited by seeing other people that her imagination has broken free of all responsibility to observed facts and invented a house for the man? In an early essay on Bishop, Marjorie Perloff suggests that at this moment, "what happens objectively is absolutely unimportant, but the poet's imagination now creates a world" (189). If this is an instance of imaginative fantasy, though, we have to say for the speaker that she doesn't stray very far from the facts: where else could a man with a baby be going? She does not know for sure, but her educated guess is that he's going to his house. This inference is more daring than the one at the beginning that the motor she hears really is attached to a motorboat she can't see, but still she is trying to say what is out there (what is "objective," to use Perloff's term).
"Cape Breton" offers a very tentative view of what we can know with any certainty and at the same time suggests that social life exists only precariously in the world: "The wild road clambers along the brink of the coast." The moment when the speaker hesitates least to infer what exists beyond the reach of her senses is The speaker still knows very little: the road's emptiness makes it "appear" abandoned (but is it really?); we "cannot see" into the interior. The driverless bulldozers, however, while reminding us of the absence of other people, also testify to the possibility of social activity, and as such they seem to produce the surprising introduction of the pronoun "we." The "we" cannot see into the interior but possesses some kind of knowledge about it anyway: there "deep lakes are reputed to be." Moving into the social world (the world of work, albeit temporarily suspended) permits a new kind of evidence, the testimony of others.
What is the status of the man's "invisible house"? Has the speaker become so excited by seeing other people that her imagination has broken free of all responsibility to observed facts and invented a house for the man? In an early essay on Bishop, Marjorie Perloff suggests that at this moment, "what happens objectively is absolutely unimportant, but the poet's imagination now creates a world" (189). If this is an instance of imaginative fantasy, though, we have to say for the speaker that she doesn't stray very far from the facts: where else could a man with a baby be going? She does not know for sure, but her educated guess is that he's going to his house. This inference is more daring than the one at the beginning that the motor she hears really is attached to a motorboat she can't see, but still she is trying to say what is out there (what is "objective," to use Perloff's term). .) The alternative to historicism, according to Rorty, is scientism, or the doctrine that scientific inquiry brings us into more accurate contact with reality than other activities do. As Rorty's commentators have observed, it is odd to classify Dewey's thought as anti-scientistic given his insistence on the special efficacy of the scientific method, both for discovering the properties of the natural world and for understanding and managing social interaction (see Rorty's commentators Lavine and Gouinlock). In understanding Dewey's philosophy of inquiry, it is important to recognize that he derived his concept of "warranted assertibility" from Peirce's work. Peirce, who disavowed later, more antirealist versions of pragmatism, claimed that scientific inquiry leads inexorably to the truth, although the path might be long or the destination perhaps indefinitely postponed: "Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion" (Peirce 273). Warrant is a weaker version of what Peirce calls "predestinate opinion"; Dewey lays his emphasis on the convergence of opinion rather than stressing that opinion converges as it approaches a true account of reality. Peirce's analysis shows, however, that this convergence would be meaningless if we didn't believe it occurred because of the reality it revealed.
Although Dewey may doubt the existence of unrevisable truths, his approach by no means denies the possibility of accuracy. Science without the possibility of accuracy would be a pointless undertaking. Some theories "work" better than others because they predict natural outcomes better; their superiority has to do with the greater degree to which they enable us to predict and make use of the otherwise intractable material of the world. Our only access to knowledge about the world must be through our inferences from evidence, and we revise those conclusions as new evidence presents itself, but we would not engage in the whole attempt to know and to predict if it were the case (or we thought it were) that all descriptions "of either nature or experience" were equally valid. As one of Rorty's critics remarks, the scientific method "is Dewey's realism"; the idea of process does not dissolve its model, the scientific process itself, which he consistently offers as the one reliable route to knowledge (Lavine 44).
Bishop's interest in Dewey, then, does not make her antirealist; on the contrary, the connection between philosopher and poet underscores in both the compatibility of realism with an interest in the social process by which knowledge is produced. Her emphasis in poetry and prose on "getting things right" and on "facts" is not simply rhetorical: in her view, persons are bound together by a shared commitment to the idea that a mind-independent world exists and can be known more or less accurately. When we describe, In understanding Dewey's philosophy of inquiry, it is important to recognize that he derived his concept of "warranted assertibility" from Peirce's work. Peirce, who disavowed later, more antirealist versions of pragmatism, claimed that scientific inquiry leads inexorably to the truth, although the path might be long or the destination perhaps indefinitely postponed: "Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion" (Peirce 273). Warrant is a weaker version of what Peirce calls "predestinate opinion"; Dewey lays his emphasis on the convergence of opinion rather than stressing that opinion converges as it approaches a true account of reality. Peirce's analysis shows, however, that this convergence would be meaningless if we didn't believe it occurred because of the reality it revealed.
Bishop's interest in Dewey, then, does not make her antirealist; on the contrary, the connection between philosopher and poet underscores in both the compatibility of realism with an interest in the social process by which knowledge is produced. Her emphasis in poetry and prose on "getting things right" and on "facts" is not simply rhetorical: in her view, persons are bound together by a shared commitment to the idea that a mind-independent world exists and can be known more or less accurately. When we describe,
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we do so with the aim of getting at what is "out there" and making it known to other people (Rorty would instead claim that such talk is motivated by the desire for an acceptable consensus, and thus social harmony). Bishop is exceptionally, even painfully conscious of the unreliability of one's own perceptions and the difficulty of communication with others. Her sensitivity to skepticism causes her continually to lower her expectations of what can be verified. Her basic attitude might be described as hopeful, rather than confident, with respect to verification by the community. Thus she expresses her knowledge as provisional, temporary, awaiting confirmation. Nevertheless, her view is essentially realist.
Bishop's provisional-realist approach can account for her disarming insistence on the presence of "fact" in her poetry. She writes in various letters, "I can't tell a lie even for art, apparently; it takes an awful effort or a sudden jolt to make me alter facts" ( Perhaps it is more important to focus on what Bishop's claims to factuality tell us about her poetics in general. Her claims draw our attention to the centrality of "settings, or descriptions" in her work. Recent criticism has taken pains to point out that Bishop is not just a "naturalist" and her poems are about more than settings. To be sure, they are about a good deal more. They are about the relationship of "setting" or sensory experience to knowledge; they are about the attempt to develop a stable, verifiable account of the world. Her "settings, or descriptions" present sensory evidence for a conclusion that the poem draws, and it is our activity as we do so with the aim of getting at what is "out there" and making it known to other people (Rorty would instead claim that such talk is motivated by the desire for an acceptable consensus, and thus social harmony). Bishop is exceptionally, even painfully conscious of the unreliability of one's own perceptions and the difficulty of communication with others. Her sensitivity to skepticism causes her continually to lower her expectations of what can be verified. Her basic attitude might be described as hopeful, rather than confident, with respect to verification by the community. Thus she expresses her knowledge as provisional, temporary, awaiting confirmation. Nevertheless, her view is essentially realist.
Bishop's provisional-realist approach can account for her disarming insistence on the presence of "fact" in her poetry. She writes in various letters, "I can't tell a lie even for art, apparently; it takes an awful effort or a sudden jolt to make me alter facts" (One Perhaps it is more important to focus on what Bishop's claims to factuality tell us about her poetics in general. Her claims draw our attention to the centrality of "settings, or descriptions" in her work. Recent criticism has taken pains to point out that Bishop is not just a "naturalist" and her poems are about more than settings. To be sure, they are about a good deal more. They are about the relationship of "setting" or sensory experience to knowledge; they are about the attempt to develop a stable, verifiable account of the world. Her "settings, or descriptions" present sensory evidence for a conclusion that the poem draws, and it is our activity as we do so with the aim of getting at what is "out there" and making it known to other people (Rorty would instead claim that such talk is motivated by the desire for an acceptable consensus, and thus social harmony). Bishop is exceptionally, even painfully conscious of the unreliability of one's own perceptions and the difficulty of communication with others. Her sensitivity to skepticism causes her continually to lower her expectations of what can be verified. Her basic attitude might be described as hopeful, rather than confident, with respect to verification by the community. Thus she expresses her knowledge as provisional, temporary, awaiting confirmation. Nevertheless, her view is essentially realist.
Bishop's provisional-realist approach can account for her disarming insistence on the presence of "fact" in her poetry. She writes in various letters, "I can't tell a lie even for art, apparently; it takes an awful effort or a sudden jolt to make me alter facts" (One Perhaps it is more important to focus on what Bishop's claims to factuality tell us about her poetics in general. Her claims draw our attention to the centrality of "settings, or descriptions" in her work. Recent criticism has taken pains to point out that Bishop is not just a "naturalist" and her poems are about more than settings. To be sure, they are about a good deal more. They are about the relationship of "setting" or sensory experience to knowledge; they are about the attempt to develop a stable, verifiable account of the world. Her "settings, or descriptions" present sensory evidence for a conclusion that the poem draws, and it is our activity as readers to judge that evidence against her conclusion. The claim that this evidence is good is her guarantee of the entire process of checking and confirmation, since we don't actually have access to the scenes and objects she describes. If her evidence does not come from the world external to her (her claim suggests), then the whole process wobbles, threatens to become meaningless. Bishop's insistence on her own factuality is an appeal to the existence of a mind-independent world and, at the same time, an appeal to the community, a vote of confidence for the existence of a common world. Bishop reaches this position only gradually over the course of her career: the development of her mature descriptive style (the meticulous accumulation of sensory detail for which she is famous) matches her emerging insistence on the factuality of her poems. Early works like "The Map" (1935) and "The Monument" (1939) emphasize perspective and the subjectivity of experience. In "The Map" (Complete Poems 3), the speaker describes the materiality of the map she's looking at ("These peninsulas take the water between thumb and finger / like women feeling for the smoothness of yardgoods") at the explicit expense of considering the map's referential function. The purpose of this exercise is to distinguish a special kind of unmotivated, aesthetic looking from the looking we do when we wish to find out something about the world external to our minds. In this aesthetic looking, guesses serve to elaborate and extend the pleasure of the experience ("Along the fine tan sandy shelf / is the land tugging at the sea from under?"). It doesn't lend itself to checking and confirmation by other observers, though such confirmation might actually occur. The second kind of lookingthe ordinary way of consulting maps-implies ongoing work of verification directed toward an accurate account of the external world. "The Map" offers that first, more "delicate" kind of looking both as a model of what we know from experience (experience is private, subjective, individual) and of art (the purpose of art is to produce in us this imaginative reverie, not to give an accurate account of something). "The Map" associates imaginative reverie with free choice: "Are they assigned, or can the countries pick their colors? / -What suits the character or the native waters best. / Topography displays no favorites." The value of the map is that it readers to judge that evidence against her conclusion. The claim that this evidence is good is her guarantee of the entire process of checking and confirmation, since we don't actually have access to the scenes and objects she describes. If her evidence does not come from the world external to her (her claim suggests), then the whole process wobbles, threatens to become meaningless. Bishop's insistence on her own factuality is an appeal to the existence of a mind-independent world and, at the same time, an appeal to the community, a vote of confidence for the existence of a common world.
Bishop reaches this position only gradually over the course of her career: the development of her mature descriptive style (the meticulous accumulation of sensory detail for which she is famous) matches her emerging insistence on the factuality of her poems. Early works like "The Map" (1935) and "The Monument" (1939) emphasize perspective and the subjectivity of experience. In "The Map" (Complete Poems 3), the speaker describes the materiality of the map she's looking at ("These peninsulas take the water between thumb and finger / like women feeling for the smoothness of yardgoods") at the explicit expense of considering the map's referential function. The purpose of this exercise is to distinguish a special kind of unmotivated, aesthetic looking from the looking we do when we wish to find out something about the world external to our minds. In this aesthetic looking, guesses serve to elaborate and extend the pleasure of the experience ("Along the fine tan sandy shelf / is the land tugging at the sea from under?"). It doesn't lend itself to checking and confirmation by other observers, though such confirmation might actually occur. The second kind of lookingthe ordinary way of consulting maps-implies ongoing work of verification directed toward an accurate account of the external world. "The Map" offers that first, more "delicate" kind of looking both as a model of what we know from experience (experience is private, subjective, individual) and of art (the purpose of art is to produce in us this imaginative reverie, not to give an accurate account of something). "The Map" associates imaginative reverie with free choice: "Are they assigned, or can the countries pick their colors? / -What suits the character or the native waters best. / Topography displays no favorites." The value of the map is that it readers to judge that evidence against her conclusion. The claim that this evidence is good is her guarantee of the entire process of checking and confirmation, since we don't actually have access to the scenes and objects she describes. If her evidence does not come from the world external to her (her claim suggests), then the whole process wobbles, threatens to become meaningless. Bishop's insistence on her own factuality is an appeal to the existence of a mind-independent world and, at the same time, an appeal to the community, a vote of confidence for the existence of a common world.
Bishop reaches this position only gradually over the course of her career: the development of her mature descriptive style (the meticulous accumulation of sensory detail for which she is famous) matches her emerging insistence on the factuality of her poems. Early works like "The Map" (1935) and "The Monument" (1939) emphasize perspective and the subjectivity of experience. In "The Map" (Complete Poems 3), the speaker describes the materiality of the map she's looking at ("These peninsulas take the water between thumb and finger / like women feeling for the smoothness of yardgoods") at the explicit expense of considering the map's referential function. The purpose of this exercise is to distinguish a special kind of unmotivated, aesthetic looking from the looking we do when we wish to find out something about the world external to our minds. In this aesthetic looking, guesses serve to elaborate and extend the pleasure of the experience ("Along the fine tan sandy shelf / is the land tugging at the sea from under?"). It doesn't lend itself to checking and confirmation by other observers, though such confirmation might actually occur. The second kind of lookingthe ordinary way of consulting maps-implies ongoing work of verification directed toward an accurate account of the external world. "The Map" offers that first, more "delicate" kind of looking both as a model of what we know from experience (experience is private, subjective, individual) and of art (the purpose of art is to produce in us this imaginative reverie, not to give an accurate account of something). "The Map" associates imaginative reverie with free choice: "Are they assigned, or can the countries pick their colors? / -What suits the character or the native waters best. / Topography displays no favorites." The value of the map is that it pays respect to the countries' preferences, just as the map itself is an occasion for preference, for the play of the reader's fancy. This poem might be said to take a Rortian view of knowledge (no description of the world "is more or less accurate or concrete than some rival") and of social life (our acknowledgment of the relativity of truth promotes the existence of the social world).7 Bishop subsequently reverses her position on the questions raised in "The Map," however; "Crusoe in England" and other late poems pronounce strongly on the importance of checking the correspondence between experience and the world. Indeed, "Crusoe" revises "The Map" (much as "Poem" revises "Large Bad Picture") by placing the speaker in a landscape that he must explore and "register" without the benefit of any previous mappings or accounts. There his inferences can be right or wrong, and his survival depends on his ability to describe the world accurately.
Bishop's letter on Darwin (1966) shows her thinking about an experience similar to the one "The Map" describes, and asking what the relationship of this experience is to fact. How can contemplation engaged in for its own sake be true or false? She answers that unmotivated experience ("perfectly useless concentration") is necessary for, though distinct from, the work of establishing facts about the world. The speaker in "The Map" makes guesses whose rightness could never be determined, but in the Darwin letter and in Bishop's later poems, hypothesizing is an activity that leads to knowledge, although it may seem at the time to lead nowhere. The hypothesis is not so much the creative inspiration of the imagination as the result of observation and thought, with the presumption of later substantiation by more observation. Darwin hypothesizes about what is true in the world, though to reach the truth he must suspend his desire for an outcome. When experience looks most private it is most emptied out of subjective content, most directed at the external world. pays respect to the countries' preferences, just as the map itself is an occasion for preference, for the play of the reader's fancy. This poem might be said to take a Rortian view of knowledge (no description of the world "is more or less accurate or concrete than some rival") and of social life (our acknowledgment of the relativity of truth promotes the existence of the social world).7 Bishop subsequently reverses her position on the questions raised in "The Map," however; "Crusoe in England" and other late poems pronounce strongly on the importance of checking the correspondence between experience and the world. Indeed, "Crusoe" revises "The Map" (much as "Poem" revises "Large Bad Picture") by placing the speaker in a landscape that he must explore and "register" without the benefit of any previous mappings or accounts. There his inferences can be right or wrong, and his survival depends on his ability to describe the world accurately.
Bishop's letter on Darwin (1966) shows her thinking about an experience similar to the one "The Map" describes, and asking what the relationship of this experience is to fact. How can contemplation engaged in for its own sake be true or false? She answers that unmotivated experience ("perfectly useless concentration") is necessary for, though distinct from, the work of establishing facts about the world. The speaker in "The Map" makes guesses whose rightness could never be determined, but in the Darwin letter and in Bishop's later poems, hypothesizing is an activity that leads to knowledge, although it may seem at the time to lead nowhere. The hypothesis is not so much the creative inspiration of the imagination as the result of observation and thought, with the presumption of later substantiation by more observation. Darwin hypothesizes about what is true in the world, though to reach the truth he must suspend his desire for an outcome. When experience looks most private it is most emptied out of subjective content, most directed at the external world. Dreams, works of art (some) glimpses of the always-more-successful surrealism of everyday life, unexpected moments of empathy (is it?), catch a peripheral vision of whatever it is one can never really see full-face but that seems enormously important. I can't believe we are wholly irrational-and I do admire Darwin-But reading Darwin one admires the beautiful solid case being built up out of his endless, heroic observations, almost unconscious or automatic-and then comes a sudden relaxation, a forgetful phrase, and one feels that strangeness of his undertaking, sees the lonely young man, his eyes fixed on facts and minute details, sinking or sliding giddily off into the unknown. What one seems to want in art, in experiencing it, is the same thing that is necessary for its creation, a self-forgetful, perfectly useless concentration. Dreams, works of art (some) glimpses of the always-more-successful surrealism of everyday life, unexpected moments of empathy (is it?), catch a peripheral vision of whatever it is one can never really see full-face but that seems enormously important. I can't believe we are wholly irrational-and I do admire Darwin-But reading Darwin one admires the beautiful solid case being built up out of his endless, heroic observations, almost unconscious or automatic-and then comes a sudden relaxation, a forgetful phrase, and one feels that strangeness of his undertaking, sees the lonely young man, his eyes fixed on facts and minute details, sinking or sliding giddily off into the unknown. What one seems to want in art, in experiencing it, is the same thing that is necessary for its creation, a self-forgetful, perfectly useless concentration. Dreams, works of art (some) glimpses of the always-more-successful surrealism of everyday life, unexpected moments of empathy (is it?), catch a peripheral vision of whatever it is one can never really see full-face but that seems enormously important. I can't believe we are wholly irrational-and I do admire Darwin-But reading Darwin one admires the beautiful solid case being built up out of his endless, heroic observations, almost unconscious or automatic-and then comes a sudden relaxation, a forgetful phrase, and one feels that strangeness of his undertaking, sees the lonely young man, his eyes fixed on facts and minute details, sinking or sliding giddily off into the unknown. What one seems to want in art, in experiencing it, is the same thing that is necessary for its creation, a self-forgetful, perfectly useless concentration. Dreams, works of art (some) glimpses of the always-more-successful surrealism of everyday life, unexpected moments of empathy (is it?), catch a peripheral vision of whatever it is one can never really see full-face but that seems enormously important. I can't believe we are wholly irrational-and I do admire Darwin-But reading Darwin one admires the beautiful solid case being built up out of his endless, heroic observations, almost unconscious or automatic-and then comes a sudden relaxation, a forgetful phrase, and one feels that strangeness of his undertaking, sees the lonely young man, his eyes fixed on facts and minute details, sinking or sliding giddily off into the unknown. What one seems to want in art, in experiencing it, is the same thing that is necessary for its creation, a self-forgetful, perfectly useless concentration. Dreams, works of art (some) glimpses of the always-more-successful surrealism of everyday life, unexpected moments of empathy (is it?), catch a peripheral vision of whatever it is one can never really see full-face but that seems enormously important. I can't believe we are wholly irrational-and I do admire Darwin-But reading Darwin one admires the beautiful solid case being built up out of his endless, heroic observations, almost unconscious or automatic-and then comes a sudden relaxation, a forgetful phrase, and one feels that strangeness of his undertaking, sees the lonely young man, his eyes fixed on facts and minute details, sinking or sliding giddily off into the unknown. What one seems to want in art, in experiencing it, is the same thing that is necessary for its creation, a self-forgetful, perfectly useless concentration. 
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rational, and thus presumably is more "conscious" than the second (which is "forgetful"), but Bishop describes the first, building a "solid case," as "unconscious." The chief characteristic of Darwin's thought, in both activities, is his attention to the facts of experience ("heroic observations" in the first case and "facts and minute details" in the second). Bishop's account of Darwin thus actually refuses to recognize a difference between "conscious" and "subconscious" activity, and indeed seems to do away with Stevenson's framework altogether: Bishop reframes the question in terms of knowledge. There are two aspects of Darwin's thought, his experiences (observations, facts) and his encounter with the unknown. What Stevenson might want to call the conscious and subconscious activities of the mind are simply, in Bishop's description, encounters with different proportions of the known (as made available by experience) and of the unknown.
The difference between building a "beautiful solid case" and "sinking or sliding giddily off into the unknown," then, is a difference between degrees of knowledge, or rather a difference between stages of inquiry into the truth: in order to build a case, Darwin must make an inference, a hypothesis, which itself seems to emerge out of a state of unformulated wonder or curiosity. It's this early stage of inquiry that Bishop wishes to analogize to "dreams, works of art, glimpses of the ... surrealism of everyday life, unexpected moments of empathy," and so on. All are examples of imaginative inferences, but about something suspected to exist. The significance of Bishop's analogy rests on the relationship of Darwin's "case" to his hypothesis: the validity of his case legitimates, retrospectively, the seemingly "useless" activity of directionless concentration. The case also shows the connection between those "facts and minute details" that Darwin contemplates as he sinks into the unknown; they're the same facts as the "endless, heroic observations" that prove the case. Darwin proceeds from experience to a warranted conclusion; the validity of this outcome legitimates the imaginative leap he must make to get to his hypothesis in the first place. It's Darwin's "case"-his theory of the origin of species-that gives force to Bishop's analogy between scientific method and works of art (and dreams, moments of empathy, etcetera). The success of Darwin's speculations implies that the "peripheral vision of whatrational, and thus presumably is more "conscious" than the second (which is "forgetful"), but Bishop describes the first, building a "solid case," as "unconscious." The chief characteristic of Darwin's thought, in both activities, is his attention to the facts of experience ("heroic observations" in the first case and "facts and minute details" in the second). Bishop's account of Darwin thus actually refuses to recognize a difference between "conscious" and "subconscious" activity, and indeed seems to do away with Stevenson's framework altogether: Bishop reframes the question in terms of knowledge. There are two aspects of Darwin's thought, his experiences (observations, facts) and his encounter with the unknown. What Stevenson might want to call the conscious and subconscious activities of the mind are simply, in Bishop's description, encounters with different proportions of the known (as made available by experience) and of the unknown.
The difference between building a "beautiful solid case" and "sinking or sliding giddily off into the unknown," then, is a difference between degrees of knowledge, or rather a difference between stages of inquiry into the truth: in order to build a case, Darwin must make an inference, a hypothesis, which itself seems to emerge out of a state of unformulated wonder or curiosity. It's this early stage of inquiry that Bishop wishes to analogize to "dreams, works of art, glimpses of the ... surrealism of everyday life, unexpected moments of empathy," and so on. All are examples of imaginative inferences, but about something suspected to exist. The significance of Bishop's analogy rests on the relationship of Darwin's "case" to his hypothesis: the validity of his case legitimates, retrospectively, the seemingly "useless" activity of directionless concentration. The case also shows the connection between those "facts and minute details" that Darwin contemplates as he sinks into the unknown; they're the same facts as the "endless, heroic observations" that prove the case. Darwin proceeds from experience to a warranted conclusion; the validity of this outcome legitimates the imaginative leap he must make to get to his hypothesis in the first place. It's Darwin's "case"-his theory of the origin of species-that gives force to Bishop's analogy between scientific method and works of art (and dreams, moments of empathy, etcetera). ever it is one can never really see full-face but that seems enormously important" is a vision of something really there, and although it may ever be only partially visible, our accumulated sightings will add up to a fuller substantiation of its existence. Inference is a matter of groping for what can't be sensed but is suspected to have an existence that others could eventually substantiate. Hypothesizing and proving are all part of the same work of knowing, Bishop insists; we go from observation to accurate knowledge without appeal to any authority outside of experience. In her remarks she both restricts what counts as a valid source of knowledge (sensory experience, not the subconscious) and at the same time refuses to take this restriction to mean that one person's knowledge would necessarily be inadequate because subjective. Darwin's knowledge is more than adequate: that's why she uses him as an example. His experience is enough to bring him into contact with an extraordinary knowledge (the partially seen, "enormously important" truth) that many have come to accept on the basis of his case and subsequent confirmations of it.
In comparison to the building of his "solid case," Darwin's contemplation of the unknown might seem self-absorbed, not outward-directed. Bishop's intent is precisely to show the continuity of these two states, though; when Darwin is "self-forgetful," he is lost in contemplation not of his own experience but of the possibility of what might be out there to see. His inquiry is "perfectly useless" in the same way that knowledge in "At the Fishhouses" (1947) is "utterly free": it is directed at no specific outcome. If his contemplation of the facts were not disinterested, his ensuing inference would be less likely to be true.
For the same reason, the self-forgetfulness of inquiry makes it lonely. That Darwin is a "lonely young man" indicates not that he can't share his experiences with anyone else, but precisely that he is reaching out for knowledge that could be confirmed by others. Darwin is alone socially (thousands of miles away from England and everyone he loves), but this condition is as much a symptom of his contemplation of the unexplored and unexplained as of his actual circumstances. The true loneliness for Darwin seems to arise not from the privacy of experience but from his dizzying contemplation of the unknown, the question of what lies beyond his expeever it is one can never really see full-face but that seems enormously important" is a vision of something really there, and although it may ever be only partially visible, our accumulated sightings will add up to a fuller substantiation of its existence. Inference is a matter of groping for what can't be sensed but is suspected to have an existence that others could eventually substantiate.
Hypothesizing and proving are all part of the same work of knowing, Bishop insists; we go from observation to accurate knowledge without appeal to any authority outside of experience. In her remarks she both restricts what counts as a valid source of knowledge (sensory experience, not the subconscious) and at the same time refuses to take this restriction to mean that one person's knowledge would necessarily be inadequate because subjective. Darwin's knowledge is more than adequate: that's why she uses him as an example. His experience is enough to bring him into contact with an extraordinary knowledge (the partially seen, "enormously important" truth) that many have come to accept on the basis of his case and subsequent confirmations of it.
For the same reason, the self-forgetfulness of inquiry makes it lonely. That Darwin is a "lonely young man" indicates not that he can't share his experiences with anyone else, but precisely that he is reaching out for knowledge that could be confirmed by others. Darwin is alone socially (thousands of miles away from England and everyone he loves), but this condition is as much a symptom of his contemplation of the unexplored and unexplained as of his actual circumstances. The true loneliness for Darwin seems to arise not from the privacy of experience but from his dizzying contemplation of the unknown, the question of what lies beyond his expe- In the middle of his reflections on the years he spent stranded on his desert island, Bishop's aged Crusoe says, "I didn't know enough. / Why didn't I know enough of something?" "Crusoe in England" is a poem about not knowing enough-not being able to see well or far enough, not knowing how to do things well enough, not being able to distinguish between fact and fantasy, and not being able to remember. Something always seems to intervene rience. What lies beyond is an explanation, a generalization that fits the facts; between the facts and the hypothesis stretches an empty space. Bishop suggests that Darwin's attempt to bridge this space is also an attempt to come into contact with others: his concentration is like a "moment of empathy," and it is a peripheral vision of what we cannot see "full-face." Bishop's comparison of empathy to scientific hypothesizing goes in two directions: inference brings us as close as we can get to knowledge of other people, and the truth at which inference aims is itself like a human face. Which comes first? Bishop resolutely refuses to pronounce on the question of whether we need facts in order to know people or, conversely, need people in order to know facts. She only pronounces on the interdependence of knowing and other people; they are necessary to each other in the same way that facts ensue from inference, and inference from facts. In the middle of his reflections on the years he spent stranded on his desert island, Bishop's aged Crusoe says, "I didn't know enough. / Why didn't I know enough of something?" "Crusoe in England" is a poem about not knowing enough-not being able to see well or far enough, not knowing how to do things well enough, not being able to distinguish between fact and fantasy, and not being able to remember. Something always seems to intervene rience. What lies beyond is an explanation, a generalization that fits the facts; between the facts and the hypothesis stretches an empty space. Bishop suggests that Darwin's attempt to bridge this space is also an attempt to come into contact with others: his concentration is like a "moment of empathy," and it is a peripheral vision of what we cannot see "full-face." Bishop's comparison of empathy to scientific hypothesizing goes in two directions: inference brings us as close as we can get to knowledge of other people, and the truth at which inference aims is itself like a human face. Which comes first? Bishop resolutely refuses to pronounce on the question of whether we need facts in order to know people or, conversely, need people in order to know facts. She only pronounces on the interdependence of knowing and other people; they are necessary to each other in the same way that facts ensue from inference, and inference from facts. In the middle of his reflections on the years he spent stranded on his desert island, Bishop's aged Crusoe says, "I didn't know enough. / Why didn't I know enough of something?" "Crusoe in England" is a poem about not knowing enough-not being able to see well or far enough, not knowing how to do things well enough, not being able to distinguish between fact and fantasy, and not being able to remember. Something always seems to intervene rience. What lies beyond is an explanation, a generalization that fits the facts; between the facts and the hypothesis stretches an empty space. Bishop suggests that Darwin's attempt to bridge this space is also an attempt to come into contact with others: his concentration is like a "moment of empathy," and it is a peripheral vision of what we cannot see "full-face." Bishop's comparison of empathy to scientific hypothesizing goes in two directions: inference brings us as close as we can get to knowledge of other people, and the truth at which inference aims is itself like a human face. Which comes first? Bishop resolutely refuses to pronounce on the question of whether we need facts in order to know people or, conversely, need people in order to know facts. She only pronounces on the interdependence of knowing and other people; they are necessary to each other in the same way that facts ensue from inference, and inference from facts. In the middle of his reflections on the years he spent stranded on his desert island, Bishop's aged Crusoe says, "I didn't know enough. / Why didn't I know enough of something?" "Crusoe in England" is a poem about not knowing enough-not being able to see well or far enough, not knowing how to do things well enough, not being able to distinguish between fact and fantasy, and not being able to remember. Something always seems to intervene rience. What lies beyond is an explanation, a generalization that fits the facts; between the facts and the hypothesis stretches an empty space. Bishop suggests that Darwin's attempt to bridge this space is also an attempt to come into contact with others: his concentration is like a "moment of empathy," and it is a peripheral vision of what we cannot see "full-face." Bishop's comparison of empathy to scientific hypothesizing goes in two directions: inference brings us as close as we can get to knowledge of other people, and the truth at which inference aims is itself like a human face. Which comes first? Bishop resolutely refuses to pronounce on the question of whether we need facts in order to know people or, conversely, need people in order to know facts. She only pronounces on the interdependence of knowing and other people; they are necessary to each other in the same way that facts ensue from inference, and inference from facts. In the middle of his reflections on the years he spent stranded on his desert island, Bishop's aged Crusoe says, "I didn't know enough. / Why didn't I know enough of something?" "Crusoe in England" is a poem about not knowing enough-not being able to see well or far enough, not knowing how to do things well enough, not being able to distinguish between fact and fantasy, and not being able to remember. Something always seems to intervene 
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ficulties that constituted his life alone on the island still linger in his mind, and he's easily reminded of them. The newspaper article that inspires him to begin reminiscing about his adventures is also the occasion for him to contemplate the difficulty of acquiring accurate knowledge. Apparently, apprehending the world is fraught with obstacles: somewhere at a distance from the volcano itself, someone saw something through his binoculars, concluded it was an eruption, reported it, and that information made its way all the way to an English newspaper, where Crusoe read of it. If one person's perception is unreliable, how much more so this long string of inferences and secondhand accounts! And yet Crusoe does seem to accept the validity of the information; he adds his own inference-"basalt, probably"-as if to imply that his experience confirms the newspaper story.
The first thing Crusoe tells us, then, is that it is possible to give an accurate and reliable account of something in the world, even though our individual capacities to sense that world are limited (the mate needs binoculars). The combined efforts of all the people involved in the sighting-down to Crusoe himself, with his "basalt, probably"-substantiate the first observation. It is a fact subject to revision by new evidence, perhaps, but good enough for us to accept in the absence of any proof to the contrary. The second thing he tells us, however, is that he has knowledge of which no accurate account has ever been given ("But my poor old island's still / unrediscovered, un-renamable. / None of the books has ever got it right"). By "None of the books has ever got it right," does he mean that none of them ever could? C. K. Doreski, Anne Colwell, and other critics say "yes," but his implication rather seems to be that only he can give a right account of his island, because only he was there and experienced it.9 He justifies his speaking presence by claiming that all previous accounts have been wrong because unsubstantiated, and promising to give the right one.
The subject of his utterance is precisely the difficulty he experi-9. "Here the distinctions between ignorance and understanding, error and truth seem impossible to ascertain" (Doreski 61); "both Bishop and her character, Crusoe, try again to 'get it right,' to capture in language the felt experience of reality, an attempt that, like all such attempts, is doomed to failure" (Colwell 204).
ficulties that constituted his life alone on the island still linger in his mind, and he's easily reminded of them. The newspaper article that inspires him to begin reminiscing about his adventures is also the occasion for him to contemplate the difficulty of acquiring accurate knowledge. Apparently, apprehending the world is fraught with obstacles: somewhere at a distance from the volcano itself, someone saw something through his binoculars, concluded it was an eruption, reported it, and that information made its way all the way to an English newspaper, where Crusoe read of it. If one person's perception is unreliable, how much more so this long string of inferences and secondhand accounts! And yet Crusoe does seem to accept the validity of the information; he adds his own inference-"basalt, probably"-as if to imply that his experience confirms the newspaper story. The first thing Crusoe tells us, then, is that it is possible to give an accurate and reliable account of something in the world, even though our individual capacities to sense that world are limited (the mate needs binoculars). The combined efforts of all the people involved in the sighting-down to Crusoe himself, with his "basalt, probably"-substantiate the first observation. It is a fact subject to revision by new evidence, perhaps, but good enough for us to accept in the absence of any proof to the contrary. The second thing he tells us, however, is that he has knowledge of which no accurate account has ever been given ("But my poor old island's still / unrediscovered, un-renamable. / None of the books has ever got it right"). By "None of the books has ever got it right," does he mean that none of them ever could? C. K. Doreski, Anne Colwell, and other critics say "yes," but his implication rather seems to be that only he can give a right account of his island, because only he was there and experienced it.9 He justifies his speaking presence by claiming that all previous accounts have been wrong because unsubstantiated, and promising to give the right one.
The subject of his utterance is precisely the difficulty he experi- The image of Crusoe sitting atop the highest volcano, counting off the others, resonates through the rest of the poem, in all the moments when we see him counting (he counts waterspouts, kinds of flora and fauna, imaginary islands, and years). Absurd as it is, the image gives us a touchstone for what knowing something accurately would mean. His knowledge seems accurate because it seems precise ("fifty-two," not fifty) and because counting is a kind of description that seems objective (more so than metaphor, like "heads blown off").?1 "Fifty-two" is not thick description, to be sure, but it has the feel of hard fact, a hardness similar to the intractable volcanic rock Crusoe feels underneath him. The importance of this moment (as a demonstration of the possibility of fact) becomes more clear when we see that it is also the moment when Crusoe's speech most resembles Darwin's. Darwin's description in his Diary of the Galapagos Islands is the source for many of Crusoe's remarks and provides a counterpoint throughout the poem to Bishop's more obvious borrowing from Defoe. Darwin complains about the ugly uniformity of the landscape, the hissing 10. Why "fifty-two"? The obvious correlation is to weeks in a year, but why Bishop would want to make this connection is unclear, unless she just meant to emphasize the tedium of Crusoe's existence. The other possible association is 1952, the year Bishop went to Brazil and met Lota de Macedo Soares (the autobiographical analogue of Crusoe's Friday). Neither of these explanations adds much to our understanding of Crusoe's observation, which seems simply to state a fact. enced when, living alone on the island, he tried to get his account of it right. He tells us that he began confident of his ability to apprehend and record the world around him, but loneliness gradually eroded this confidence and also sapped his desire to be right. This downward trajectory ends only when Friday joins him on the island. He continues, Well, I had fifty-two miserable, small volcanoes I could climb with a few slithery stridesvolcanoes dead as ash heaps. I used to sit on the edge of the highest one and count the others standing up, naked and leaden, with their heads blown off.
The image of Crusoe sitting atop the highest volcano, counting off the others, resonates through the rest of the poem, in all the moments when we see him counting (he counts waterspouts, kinds of flora and fauna, imaginary islands, and years). Absurd as it is, the image gives us a touchstone for what knowing something accurately would mean. His knowledge seems accurate because it seems precise ("fifty-two," not fifty) and because counting is a kind of description that seems objective (more so than metaphor, like "heads blown off").?1 "Fifty-two" is not thick description, to be sure, but it has the feel of hard fact, a hardness similar to the intractable volcanic rock Crusoe feels underneath him.
The importance of this moment (as a demonstration of the possibility of fact) becomes more clear when we see that it is also the moment when Crusoe's speech most resembles Darwin's. Darwin's description in his Diary of the Galapagos Islands is the source for many of Crusoe's remarks and provides a counterpoint throughout the poem to Bishop's more obvious borrowing from Defoe. Darwin complains about the ugly uniformity of the landscape, the hissing 10. Why "fifty-two"? The obvious correlation is to weeks in a year, but why Bishop would want to make this connection is unclear, unless she just meant to emphasize the tedium of Crusoe's existence. The other possible association is 1952, the year Bishop went to Brazil and met Lota de Macedo Soares (the autobiographical analogue of Crusoe's Friday). Neither of these explanations adds much to our understanding of Crusoe's observation, which seems simply to state a fact. enced when, living alone on the island, he tried to get his account of it right. He tells us that he began confident of his ability to apprehend and record the world around him, but loneliness gradually eroded this confidence and also sapped his desire to be right. This downward trajectory ends only when Friday joins him on the island. He continues, Well, I had fifty-two miserable, small volcanoes I could climb with a few slithery stridesvolcanoes dead as ash heaps. I used to sit on the edge of the highest one and count the others standing up, naked and leaden, with their heads blown off.
The importance of this moment (as a demonstration of the possibility of fact) becomes more clear when we see that it is also the moment when Crusoe's speech most resembles Darwin's. Darwin's description in his Diary of the Galapagos Islands is the source for many of Crusoe's remarks and provides a counterpoint throughout the poem to Bishop's more obvious borrowing from Defoe. Darwin complains about the ugly uniformity of the landscape, the hissing of the tortoises, the "naked" appearance of the lava flows, the continuous dripping of water from low-hanging clouds and even makes the startling comment that "the inhabitants here lead a sort of Robinson Crusoe life" (Darwin 336; elsewhere in the diary he also notes waterspouts and fields of blue shells). One feature of the islands that strikes particular wonder in Darwin is their strange volcanic topography: "A few leagues to the North a broken country was studded with small black cones, the ancient chimneys for subterranean melted fluids.... Crusoe's confidence about his knowledge only declines from this point, and indeed his grotesque metaphor for the volcanoes, "naked and leaden, with their heads blown off," suggests as much. (Crusoe speaks of many objects as having heads or throats: "a breath of steam," the "parched throats" of the craters, the waterspouts with "their heads in cloud," and so on. He populates his empty world by using figurative language, and yet even in that of the tortoises, the "naked" appearance of the lava flows, the continuous dripping of water from low-hanging clouds and even makes the startling comment that "the inhabitants here lead a sort of Robinson Crusoe life" (Darwin 336; elsewhere in the diary he also notes waterspouts and fields of blue shells). One feature of the islands that strikes particular wonder in Darwin is their strange volcanic topography: "A few leagues to the North a broken country was studded with small black cones, the ancient chimneys for subterranean melted fluids.... As he carries out his inquiries, however, Crusoe's loneliness gradually begins to mar his ability to observe accurately, and even to pervert his desire to know the facts. He continues to count but becomes obsessed with the number "one" ("The island had one kind of everything" [163]), because he can't stop thinking about being alone. He ceases to try to see the world as it is and imagines instead that he's at home in England, where there are other people: looking at piles of purple snail shells, he suggests that "at a distance, you'd swear that they were beds of irises" (a guess he knows isn't right). Similarly, he closes his eyes when he hears the gulls fly up, in order to imagine that he's hearing the sound of wind in a tree. Instead of counting volcanoes, he names and renames them, Crusoe knows what's happening to him, and at night he dreams about what the final outcome will be: he has two nightmares, first of killing a baby, "mistaking it / for a baby goat," and second of living on an infinite series of identical islands whose flora, fauna, and geography he must register. These are nightmares of trying to know without other people: making mistakes because there's nobody around to check your observations, and having to carry out all the inquiry by yourself. That is, he dreams of fatally wrong and infinitely prolonged guessing without the benefit of the correction, confirmation, or aid of others. As in "Cape Breton," where stupid sheep stampede terrified into the sea, the consequences of not knowing enough are violence and death.
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These nightmares suggest a vision of the social world as a place where people help each other with their hypotheses, and the facts established through this collective effort are what they have in common. Ultimately "Crusoe in England" offers the same vision: we can't know anything in the absence of other people. Just as importantly, we don't care to know anything without the motivation of other people. Inquiry grows increasingly pointless for Crusoe: not only does he lack the opportunity to confirm his observations and hypotheses, but there is no one with whom to entrust his findings. If he were to die unrescued on his island, what would have been the point of registering anything at all about it? The pragmatists do not examine this aspect of investigation, the motivation supplied by the desire to contribute to the general store of knowledge or to have one's contributions acknowledged. As Bishop recognizes, however, individual psychological motivation is as necessary to the process of finding out the truth as is the presence of a confirming community. Both aspects of the process point toward the inextricably social nature of knowing, without implying that knowledge is wholly "constructed" by the social context that encourages it to happen.
Bishop is also sensitive to the difference between value and Crusoe knows what's happening to him, and at night he dreams about what the final outcome will be: he has two nightmares, first of killing a baby, "mistaking it / for a baby goat," and second of living on an infinite series of identical islands whose flora, fauna, and geography he must register. These are nightmares of trying to know without other people: making mistakes because there's nobody around to check your observations, and having to carry out all the inquiry by yourself. That is, he dreams of fatally wrong and infinitely prolonged guessing without the benefit of the correction, confirmation, or aid of others. As in "Cape Breton," where stupid sheep stampede terrified into the sea, the consequences of not knowing enough are violence and death.
Bishop is also sensitive to the difference between value and The museum, like the newspaper from which Crusoe learns about recent volcanic eruptions, assembles information for the public, and we consume it individually, without interacting with each other. Social contact is indirect; that is, it takes place through these shared sources of information. The museum and the newspaper are places (actual or virtual) where people correct, confirm, and increase their knowledge. These institutions, while they encourage and protect the development of knowledge, cannot supply value in the way that the intimate colloquy between Crusoe and Friday could. The museum and the companion constitute two very different kinds of community, and it is clear which one Crusoe finds more essential and life-affirming. Crusoe describes England as "uninteresting" and boring, though "real": is this world of facts worth living in? It may not be, but the poem doesn't offer much of an alternative. Crusoe concludes ruefully with a simple fact, a number, that can only gesture at the loss he feels: "And Friday, my dear Friday, died of measles / seventeen years ago come March." Crusoe's final, melancholic remarks might seem to undercut his
